Vulnerability to Shocks in EMU: 1991–2004 (in English) by Oscar Bajo-Rubio & Carmen Díaz-Roldán
Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 5-6                                       225 
UDC: 339.738(4-672) 
JEL classification: E65, F33, F41 
Keywords: Monetary union, EMU, asymmetric shocks, temporary shocks
Vulnerability to Shocks in EMU: 1991–2004* 
Oscar BAJO-RUBIO – Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha and Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 
(oscar.bajo@uclm.es – corresponding author) 
Carmen DÍAZ-ROLDÁN – Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha 
Abstract 
We analyze the nature of economic shocks hitting European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) member countries from 1991 to 2004, as well as for two sub-periods before and after 
the launch of EMU. To this end, we first evaluate the relative importance of symmetric versus 
asymmetric shocks, and then extract their temporary component. Our final aim would be as-
sessing the vulnerability of EMU to transitory asymmetric shocks, that is, to the most harmful 
situation for the operation of a monetary union. Overall, our results show that in the period 
of analysis, symmetric shocks predominated over asymmetric shocks, but the temporary com-
ponent of asymmetric shocks was higher than that of symmetric shocks. 
1.  Introduction 
Starting on 1 January 1999, 12 European countries formed the so-called Econo-
mic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, as stressed by the literature on optimum 
currency areas initiated in (Mundell, 1961), the presence of asymmetric shocks (i.e., 
those  requiring  a different  optimal  policy  response  in  different  countries)  represents 
a potential  difficulty  for  the adequate  working  of  a monetary  union.  The argument  is 
well  known:  a common  monetary  policy  for  all  the member  countries  of  the union 
cannot be the proper instrument when facing asymmetric shocks. The ultimate reason is 
that for each member country forming a monetary union means not only surrendering 
monetary  policy  independence,  but  also  losing  the exchange  rate v i s - à -vis  the other 
members of the union as a potential shock absorber; this in turn raises the importance of 
fiscal policy in order to cope with asymmetric shocks (see, e.g., (Bajo-Rubio, Díaz- 
-Roldán, 2003)). Accordingly, in the years before the start of EMU a large number of 
empirical studies tried to characterize, using different methodologies, the kind of shocks 
affecting the European economies as well as the main features of their business cycle. 
A non-exhaustive list would include, among others, (Cohen, Wyplosz, 1989), (Bayoumi, 
Eichengreen,  1993),  (von  Hagen,  Neumann,  1994),  (Helg  et  al.,  1995),  (Bayoumi, 
Prasad, 1997), (Forni, Reichlin, 2001), (Barrios, de Lucio, 2003) and (Artis et al., 2004); 
an up-to-date review of the issue is provided in (De Grauwe, 2005). 
In an influential contribution, Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) argued that it is 
not enough to determine whether shocks are symmetric or asymmetric. They argue 
that, due to the presence of an externality in the trade balance of a monetary union, 
the distinction between permanent and transitory shocks would also be relevant. In 
particular, asymmetric and temporary shocks would be those that are potentially more 
harmful for the operation of a monetary union. 
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On t he other h and, F rankel  and  Rose  (1998)  claim  that  greater  economic 
integration would lead to increased trade, which would result in more highly correlated 
business cycles. This effect, however, might be offset if (as argued by, e.g., Krugman, 
(1993)) an increase in industrial specialization across countries would develop, resulting 
in more asynchronous business cycles after an industry-specific shock. Still, Frankel and 
Rose present evidence supporting their hypothesis from twenty industrialized countries 
over a thirty-year period. As an implication of these results, Frankel and Rose argue that, 
by  expanding  trade  among  members  and  increasing  the correlation of  their  business 
cycles, EMU might be more desirable ex post than ex ante.
Some evidence supporting the above-mentioned ideas is provided in (Rose, 
Engel, 2002) using a sample of 210 countries between 1960 and 1996. Rose and Engel 
conclude that countries that are members of a currency union would have more trade and 
more highly synchronized business cycles in comparison with countries having their 
own currencies. In turn, Alesina et al. (2002) find, from a similar data set, that the for-
mation of a monetary union would tend to increase the volume of bilateral trade and 
the co-movement of prices among members, but would not be systematically related to 
the co-movement of outputs. However, Tenreyro and Barro (2007) observe that the esti-
mation of the effects of a monetary union on economic variables could be affected by 
a problem of endogeneity. Once this problem is addressed, using an instrumental vari-
ables approach, Tenreyro and Barro ascertain that the co-movement of outputs would 
actually decrease following the formation of a monetary union, which they interpret as 
consistent with the view that currency unions lead to greater sectoral specialization. 
Notice, on the other hand, that none of these papers analyze the case of EMU. 
In  this  paper  we  re-examine  the issue  of  the nature  of  the shocks  hitting 
the EMU member countries, before and after the start of EMU, following Cohen and 
Wyplosz’s (1989) approach. In particular, we should be able to assess whether the for-
mation of EMU had led to a greater similarity of the participating economies (con-
firming Frankel and Rose’s arguments) or, on the contrary, to an increase in speci-
alization, which would have important consequences on the working of EMU in 
practice. The underlying framework and empirical methodology, together with the main 
results, are presented in the next section; the final section concludes. 
2.  Methodology and Empirical Results 
The argument on the relevance of the degree of temporariness of the shocks 
for a monetary union relies on Cohen and Wyplosz’s (1989) concept of “trade ba-
lance externality”. These authors consider the case of a monetary union made up of 
two identical countries. The trade balance of the union with the rest of the world is 
determined by the common real exchange rate, and each country’s trade balance is 
equal to one half of the union’s trade balance. Then, the externality arises because 
each country does not necessarily perceive the relationship between its own trade ba-
lance and the common real exchange rate. Take the case of, e.g., a depreciation of 
the union’s real exchange rate. This would lead each country to overestimate the res-
ponsiveness of its own trade balance, for two reasons. First, if the partner’s trade 
balance is taken as given, a country expects that all the effect of the depreciation will 
be reflected one-for-one in its own trade balance. But, since the imports from the rest 
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will worsen the partner’s trade balance, which implies an additional improvement in 
its own trade balance.  
Given this externality, Cohen and Wyplosz argue, whether the shocks poten-
tially affecting a monetary union are permanent or transitory becomes crucial, in ad-
dition to their characterization as symmetric or asymmetric. The basic argument runs 
as follows. Faced with a permanent (symmetric or asymmetric), e.g., adverse output 
shock, a country would respond optimally through the corresponding fall in demand, 
so the trade balance would remain in equilibrium. Conversely, if the shock was both 
transitory and asymmetric, the optimal response would now be to maintain spending 
roughly unchanged, which would be achieved through a trade deficit (surplus) via 
a real exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) in the country where output falls 
(rises). However, not only the optimal response to the shock in each country will hurt 
the other, due to its asymmetric nature, but, in the search of a new equilibrium, both 
countries would overreact, failing to recognize the trade balance externality that ap-
pears in a monetary union. Finally, notice that this inefficiency would also occur in 
the case of a transitory and symmetric shock although to a lesser extent, since now 
both countries would call for the same response to the shock. As a consequence, tran-
sitory asymmetric shocks would be those more potentially harmful for the operation 
of a monetary union. 
Cohen and Wyplosz also propose a simple method for assessing the relative 
importance of symmetric versus asymmetric shocks, and of permanent versus tem-
porary shocks. If we denote as X1 and X2 the levels of a particular variable for two 
economies: 
First, symmetric shocks are captured by their sum, X1+ X2, and asymmetric 
shocks by their difference, X 1í X2. The relative importance of symmetric 
versus asymmetric shocks would be evaluated by their corresponding standard 
deviations.
1
Second, the temporary component of both symmetric and asymmetric shocks 
is  calculated.  The ratio  of  the standard  deviation  of  these  temporary  com-
ponents  over  the standard deviation  of  each  original  series  would  measure 
the extent  of  permanent  versus  temporary  shocks,  for  either  symmetric  or 
asymmetric shocks. 
This  identification  of  symmetric  and  asymmetric  shocks  with  the sum  and 
the difference of X1 and X2 is reminiscent of Aoki (1981). Notice that, in the two- 
-country case, asymmetric shocks would include both country-specific shocks, i.e., 
those affecting one of the countries but not the other, as well as those shocks that 
affect the two countries but lead to opposite effects in each of them, thus requiring 
1 Notice that, denoting as var and cov the variance and covariance, respectively:  
var (X1+ X2) = var (X1) + var (X2) + 2 cov (X1, X2)
var (X1í X2) = var (X1) + var (X2) í 2 cov (X1, X2)
so that the standard deviation of (X1+ X2) will be higher (lower) than the standard deviation of (X1í X2),
provided that the covariance between X1 and X2 was positive (negative). In other words, when symmetric
and asymmetric shocks are identified this way, the former will be quantitatively more (less) important than
the latter if the real GDP of economy 1 is positively (negatively) correlated with that of economy 2. In
the same way, the relative importance of both kinds of shocks (symmetric versus asymmetric) will be
higher the greater, in absolute value, the (positive or negative) correlation between the levels of real GDP
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a different policy response. On the other hand, regarding the temporary component of 
shocks, recall that the objective of this empirical approach is not to separate out trend 
and temporary components, but rather to compare the relative proportion of the tem-
porary component for the sum and the difference of X1 and X2, which reveal sym-
metric and asymmetric shocks, respectively; see (Cohen, Wyplosz, 1989, p. 322). 
In their original contribution, Cohen and Wyplosz applied this procedure to 
the real GDP, GDP deflator, and real wages of France and Germany for the period 
1965–1987. The results suggested that symmetric shocks were much larger than asym-
metric shocks, but the predominance of transitory shocks was greater for the latter. 
The procedure was repeated to analyze the kind of shocks experienced by “Europe” 
(consisting  of  the sum  of  France  and  Germany)  and  the United  States,  obtaining 
somewhat different results; in particular, it was no longer true that symmetric shocks 
prevail over asymmetric shocks, and there was no overwhelming association between 
temporariness and asymmetric shocks. From this evidence, they concluded that, from 
the point of view of the shocks they faced, a monetary union would make more sense 
between France and Germany than between “Europe” and the United States. 
Note that Cohen and Wyplosz did not provide a systematic application of this 
methodology to all potential candidate countries for EMU membership in order to 
analyze the nature of the shocks they faced, as we will do in this paper. More pre-
cisely, they presented a simple illustration in the context of a broader discussion of 
some of the main issues in the debate at that time on the formation of EMU, such as 
the extent of seigniorage and the role of the European Monetary System in dealing 
with the trade balance externality. 
In this section we apply the above method to real GDP data (in millions of 
euros, at 1995 prices and exchange rates, seasonally adjusted), for all the countries 
participating in EMU (except Luxembourg), against the whole euro zone (excluding 
the country concerned in each case). In addition, we have also considered the case of 
the three EU members that chose not to participate in EMU from the start, i.e., Den-
mark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The data are quarterly, covering the period 
from  1991.I  through  2004.IV  (except  for  Ireland,  Portugal  and  Sweden,  where 
the data are available from 1997.I, 1995.I, and 1993.I, respectively), and are taken 
from Eurostat. Finally, the exercise has been performed for the whole period, and for 
the two subperiods 1991.I–1998.IV and 1999.I–2004.IV, in order to assess whether 
the nature  of  the shocks  faced  by  the European  economies  would  have  changed 
before and after the start of EMU. 
The results for the whole period are presented in Table 1. Part A of the table 
shows the size of symmetric and asymmetric shocks, as measured by their standard 
deviation. In addition, we also present the variances and covariances of the GDPs of 
every country in the table and that of the euro zone (excluding the country concerned 
in each case). Part B of the table, in turn, shows the temporary component of both sym-
metric and asymmetric shocks, as measured by the ratio of the standard deviation of 
the temporary component to the standard deviation of the original series, in percen-
tage. The temporary component has been calculated using three alternative methods: 
a linear trend, a quadratic trend, and the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  
As can be seen, when measured by their standard deviations, symmetric 
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countries over the period of analysis, reflecting the presence of a positive covariance 
of the real GDP of each EMU member country and that of the rest of the euro zone. 
The countries where asymmetric shocks were larger are Ireland, Finland, Greece and 
Germany, and the opposite occurred in the case of France, Belgium and Austria. On 
the other hand, the variability of the own GDP was higher than that of the rest of 
EMU in the case of Greece, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Finland. The op-
posite  result holds  for Germany  and Italy,  whereas  for  the rest of t he countries 
the weights  of  the variability  of  the own  output,  that  of  the rest  of  EMU,  and 
TABLE 1  Vulnerability to Shocks in EMU: Whole Period 1991.I–2004.IV 
Part A  Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Shocks 
Symmetric  Asymmetric  var (X1) var (X2) cov (X1,X2)
Belgium  0.0740  0.0042  0.001378  0.001421  0.001364 
Germany  0.0690  0.0213  0.000600  0.002059  0.001078 
Greece  0.0887  0.0220  0.003018  0.001236  0.001846 
Spain  0.0891  0.0168  0.002840  0.001348  0.001914 
France  0.0748  0.0037  0.001383  0.001480  0.001399 
Ireland  0.0924  0.0477  0.005071  0.000525  0.001566 
Italy  0.0678  0.0118  0.000824  0.001592  0.001116 
Netherlands  0.0836  0.0126  0.002227  0.001416  0.001708 
Austria  0.0769  0.0055  0.001579  0.001452  0.001473 
Portugal  0.0616  0.0092  0.001089  0.000902  0.000928 
Finland  0.0959  0.0229  0.003530  0.001424  0.002170 
Denmark  0.0783  0.0083  0.001706  0.001456  0.001518 
Sweden  0.0789  0.0094  0.001959  0.001267  0.001534 
United 
Kingdom  0.0874  0.0136  0.002532  0.001456  0.001865 
Part B  Temporary Component of the Shocks (%) 
Symmetric  Asymmetric 
L Q HP L Q HP
Belgium  15.74  14.96  9.68  99.32  84.77  76.52 
Germany  21.54  20.29  9.70  29.21  16.37  12.12 
Greece  22.74  15.65  7.67  55.76  36.42  22.71 
Spain  20.96  18.14  7.50  30.40  23.79  17.24 
France  21.86  19.43  9.18  92.09  84.49  68.96 
Ireland  19.16  8.86  11.33  19.16  11.99  13.69 
Italy  21.47  20.48  9.95  38.27  25.00  19.96 
Netherlands  22.25  22.23  8.34  72.71  85.16  22.79 
Austria  19.60  19.14  7.45  95.22  66.67  53.14 
Portugal  25.68  12.87  11.01  99.32  37.30  40.26 
Finland  23.41  21.69  9.56  47.49  46.87  30.82 
Denmark  20.49  20.44  8.74  94.10  64.75  42.91 
Sweden  11.57  10.08  7.73  42.87  38.93  34.74 
United Kingdom  17.94  17.29  6.25  45.70  41.67  25.21 
Notes:
a Part A: The first two columns show the standard deviations of X 1+ X2 and X 1í X2, and the last three 
the variances and covariances of X1 and X2, where X1 and X2 denote, respectively, the (log of the) GDP 
for every country in the table and the euro zone (excluding the country concerned in each case). 
 b Part B: Ratio of the standard deviation of the temporary component to the standard deviation of
X1+ X2 or X1í X2, for symmetric and asymmetric shocks, respectively, in percentage. L, Q, and HP 
denote the method used to smooth the original series, i.e., a linear trend, a quadratic trend, and the Hod-
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the covariance  were  roughly  similar.  However,  when  computing  their  temporary 
component, this was clearly higher for asymmetric than for symmetric shocks, with 
the exceptions of Germany, Ireland, and, to a lesser extent, Spain and Italy. Finally, 
the pattern for the three countries that chose not to participate in EMU is not very 
different from that followed by the rest. 
The results before and after the start of EMU appear in Table 2 and Table 3,
respectively. First, according to their standard deviations shown in Part A of both ta-
bles, the weight of asymmetric shocks increased, from the first subperiod to the se-
cond, for Ireland, Greece, Germany, Belgium, Italy and, very slightly, Spain and Au-
stria. Conversely, asymmetric shocks became relatively less important, once EMU 
came into force, only for Finland, the Netherlands, France and Portugal (very slightly 
TABLE 2  Vulnerability to Shocks in EMU: Subperiod 1991.I–1998.IV 
Part A  Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Shocks 
Symmetric  Asymmetric  var (X1) var (X2) cov (X1,X2)
Belgium  0.0371  0.0034  0.000392  0.000305  0.000332 
Germany  0.0330  0.0076  0.000175  0.000401  0.000251 
Greece  0.0377  0.0067  0.000428  0.000308  0.000335 
Spain  0.0409  0.0077  0.000579  0.000288  0.000391 
France  0.0333  0.0043  0.000228  0.000336  0.000264 
Ireland  0.0292  0.0150  0.000490  0.000052  0.000138 
Italy  0.0338  0.0035  0.000258  0.000320  0.000274 
Netherlands  0.0451  0.0117  0.000802  0.000285  0.000460 
Austria  0.0392  0.0058  0.000485  0.000303  0.000365 
Portugal  0.0314  0.0094  0.000413  0.000127  0.000211 
Finland  0.0492  0.0174  0.001067  0.000299  0.000515 
Denmark  0.0442  0.0104  0.000726  0.000308  0.000449 
Sweden  0.0393  0.0068  0.000523  0.000273  0.000359 
United 
Kingdom  0.0467  0.0128  0.000868  0.000308  0.000490 
Part B  Temporary Component of the Shocks (%) 
Symmetric  Asymmetric 
L Q HP L Q HP
Belgium  26.12  17.92  19.30  76.50  80.75  75.07 
Germany  26.08  17.15  18.76  51.86  28.50  34.10 
Greece  35.51  17.13  21.62  97.62  74.23  79.24 
Spain  30.37  13.68  17.72  61.13  25.24  33.99 
France  28.39  16.11  18.83  58.05  56.63  52.87 
Ireland  21.24  12.63  21.18  24.74  20.82  24.70 
Italy  27.80  18.87  20.21  82.08  78.33  75.18 
Netherlands  22.89  10.69  13.52  22.78  16.22  17.20 
Austria  18.56  10.92  12.53  48.71  38.80  39.19 
Portugal  11.71  6.40  11.09  24.19  24.17  24.12 
Finland  41.06  16.01  22.31  74.97  34.57  43.88 
Denmark  21.84  16.66  16.97  43.86  42.20  40.01 
Sweden  19.93  11.97  11.74  19.04  34.15  38.83 
United Kingdom  17.39  10.84  11.93  31.81  30.56  29.18 
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in this case), and, interestingly, for the three “outsiders” (Denmark, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom). On the other hand, the variability of the own GDP decreased 
in all cases, with Greece and Ireland being the only exceptions; and the variability of 
the GDP of the rest of EMU slightly decreased, except in the case of Ireland and 
Portugal. The covariance, in turn, experienced also a generalized decrease, with the ex-
ception, again, of Ireland, and was roughly unchanged for Greece. 
We now turn to the temporary component of shocks, shown in Part B of both 
tables. As can be seen, in the second subperiod the temporary component of symme-
tric shocks decreased, or remained at similar levels, for France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Finland, and Spain, and increased for the rest of the countries. Finally, the temporary 
component of asymmetric shocks remained roughly unchanged in the EMU subpe-
TABLE 3  Vulnerability to Shocks in EMU: Subperiod 1999.I–2004.IV 
Part A  Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Shocks 
Symmetric  Asymmetric  var (X1) var (X2) cov (X1,X2)
Belgium  0.0273  0.0071  0.000158  0.000230  0.000173 
Germany  0.0264  0.0127  0.000056  0.000375  0.000129 
Greece  0.0433  0.0213  0.001028  0.000138  0.000341 
Spain  0.0357  0.0081  0.000457  0.000216  0.000291 
France  0.0299  0.0028  0.000211  0.000240  0.000212 
Ireland  0.0582  0.0298  0.001930  0.000214  0.000599 
Italy  0.0258  0.0069  0.000094  0.000264  0.000149 
Netherlands  0.0243  0.0078  0.000082  0.000246  0.000128 
Austria  0.0265  0.0062  0.000130  0.000237  0.000163 
Portugal  0.0235  0.0087  0.000078  0.000236  0.000114 
Finland  0.0349  0.0076  0.000408  0.000230  0.000278 
Denmark  0.0264  0.0047  0.000153  0.000276  0.000194 
Sweden  0.0320  0.0047  0.000294  0.000232  0.000241 
United 
Kingdom  0.0339  0.0058  0.000361  0.000232  0.000268 
Part B  Temporary Component of the Shocks (%) 
Symmetric  Asymmetric 
L Q HP L Q HP
Belgium  30.11  21.82  26.04  87.64  68.65  77.76 
Germany  35.40  20.14  28.17  24.63  21.25  22.51 
Greece  14.32  11.52  12.86  23.01  20.93  21.71 
Spain  21.70  12.40  17.32  41.20  30.99  35.64 
France  31.58  18.94  25.39  95.40  87.01  89.57 
Ireland  23.16  12.67  19.00  22.10  19.56  21.04 
Italy  34.77  18.75  27.36  29.41  26.51  27.55 
Netherlands  40.90  22.82  32.34  26.99  26.97  26.78 
Austria  28.42  18.94  23.45  72.84  51.29  61.89 
Portugal  44.87  23.79  35.06  36.97  35.83  36.30 
Finland  21.77  16.75  18.88  70.20  53.57  61.31 
Denmark  29.25  49.38  23.74  65.10  78.95  56.21 
Sweden  23.33  16.44  19.62  87.14  63.34  74.62 
United Kingdom  19.89  13.82  16.63  65.15  31.91  50.41 
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riod for Belgium, Spain, Ireland, and Finland; it fell only for Germany, Greece, and 
Italy, and increased for France, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and the three “out-
siders” (Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom). 
In summary, the importance of asymmetric shocks decreases in a few cases 
(despite the general decrease in output variability), and the same can be said about 
the degree of temporariness of asymmetric shocks. Accordingly, there is not much 
room for discerning a particularly differentiated pattern across countries from the first 
subperiod to the second. 
Finally, in order to check whether the differences in the results from Table 2
and Table 3 are significant or not, we have performed a simple test of the equality of 
two variances. In its general form, for any two variables x and y, this test involves 



























which, under the null hypothesis of equality of the two variances, is distributed as 
a Snedecor’s F with m í 1 and n í 1 degrees of freedom. This test has been applied 
to the variability of symmetric and asymmetric shocks, and their temporary com-
ponent, i.e., the (square of) the denominator and numerator of the ratios shown in 
Part B of Tables 2 and 3, respectively. The results appear in Table 4 and, as can be 
seen, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level in m ost cases. Thus, 
according to the results of the test, the implementation of EMU would not have led, 




Temporary component of the shocks 
Symmetric  Asymmetric  Sym-
metric
Asym-
metric L Q HP L Q HP
Belgium  1.3518  0.6557  1.1729  1.1102  1.0023  0.5723  0.7713  0.6330 
Germany  1.2428  0.5945  0.9158  1.0582  0.8279  1.2518  0.7974  0.9005 
Greece  0.8668  0.3130
* 2.1482
* 1.2891  1.4568  1.3278  1.1096  1.1420 
Spain  1.1372  0.9527  1.5914  1.2551  1.1636  1.4135  0.7759  0.9086 
France  1.1072  1.5010  0.9956  0.9416  0.8214  0.9134  0.9770  0.8859 
Ireland  0.5259  0.5264  0.4824  0.5240  0.5860  0.5893  0.5605  0.6178 
Italy  1.3008  0.5067  1.0403  1.3093  0.9610  1.4137  1.4971  1.3825 
Netherla
nds 1.8405  1.4910  1.0302  0.8621  0.7695  1.2586  0.8967  0.9581 
Austria  1.4697  1.0957  0.9600  0.8473  0.7855  0.7327  0.8288  0.6939 
Portugal  1.3534  1.0923  0.3535
* 0.3643
* 0.4284  0.7149  0.7369  0.7257 
Finland  1.4047  2.2687
* 2.6488
* 1.3429  1.6597  2.4231
* 1.4642  1.6239 
Denmark  1.6680  2.1774
* 1.2455  0.5628  1.1923  1.4670  1.1640  1.5498 
Sweden  1.2251  1.4412  1.0465  0.8924  0.7332  0.7520  0.7770  0.7499 
United 
Kingdom  1.3697  2.1912
* 1.1973  1.0742  0.9830  1.0699  2.0981  1.2686 
Note: F-test statistic of the equality of two variances; * denotes significance at the 5% level. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 5-6                                       233 
at least in the first years, to significant changes in the characteristics of the shocks af-
fecting the EMU member countries on statistical grounds. 
3.  Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  have  analyzed  the nature  of  the shocks  hitting t h e   E M U  
member countries over the period 1991–2004, as well as for the two subperiods be-
fore and after the start of EMU, following the approach of Cohen and Wyplosz (1989). 
According to our results, during the whole period symmetric shocks predominated 
over asymmetric shocks; however, the temporary component of asymmetric shocks 
was higher than that of symmetric shocks. In other words, although asymmetric 
shocks were less important in quantitative terms than symmetric shocks, when they 
did occur they were potentially more harmful.  
These results, on the other hand, would not be too different from those found 
for the three countries that chose not to participate in EMU from its start (i.e., Den-
mark, Sweden and the United Kingdom), unlike the case of the Central and Eastern 
European countries analyzed in a companion paper. According to the results in (Bajo- 
-Rubio, Díaz-Roldán, 2005), the predominance of symmetric shocks was lower, and 
the temporary component of asymmetric shocks higher, than in the case of the EMU 
members, with Hungary, Slovenia and, to a lesser extent, Poland facing a more favour-
able situation.
2
In addition, we analyzed the change across the two subperiods, before and after 
the start of EMU in January 1999.  First,  the importance  of  asymmetric shocks de-
creased only in the cases of Finland, the Netherlands, France and Portugal, as well as 
for the three “outsiders” (Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom); also, output 
variability decreased in all cases, with the only exceptions of Greece and Ireland. In 
turn, the degree of temporariness of asymmetric shocks decreased only for Germany, 
Greece, and Italy. These differences in results, however, did not prove to be signifi-
cant, according to a simple test of the equality of two variances. 
Although these results should be taken with caution, due to the still short pe-
riod of time available for analysis, they would suggest, if anything, a certain increase 
in specialization in production following the formation of EMU. More importantly, our 
results do not allow discerning any different patterns between the European “centre” and 
“periphery” (as in, e.g., (Bayoumi, Eichengreen, 1993)), or for the three countries that 
chose not to participate in EMU from its start. 
2 In fact, Slovenia finally joined EMU in January 2007. 234                                        Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 5-6 
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